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Optimal equity infusions in interbank networks
Hamed Amini, Andreea Minca, Agnès Sulem
Abstract
We study optimal equity infusions into a financial network prone to the risk of
contagious failures, which may be due to insolvency or to bank runs by short term
creditors. Bank runs can be triggered by failures of connected banks.
Under complete information on interbank linkages, we show that the problem reduces
to a combinatorial optimization problem. Subject to budget constraints, the government
chooses the set of minimal cost whose survival induces the maximum network stability.
Our results demonstrate that the optimal equity infusion might significantly mitigate
failure contagion risk and stabilize the system. In the case of partial information on the
network, the controllers’ focus swiftly changes from preventing insolvencies to preventing
runs by short term creditors.
Keywords: Systemic risk, Markov decision process, Liquidity risk, Rollover risk,
Financial contagion.
1 Introduction
During the financial crisis, systemic risk has emerged as a major concern for governments,
financial regulators and risk managers. By contrast with the traditional approach in risk
management, the focus is no longer on modeling and managing the risks faced by a sin-
gle financial institution, but on taking into account the interrelations between financial
institutions and the complex mechanisms of distress propagation.
Limiting systemic risk requires new analytical and computational tools. Most research
in this area focuses on systemic risk measurement and attribution. Recent works propose
systemic risk measures within the framework of network models for insolvency risk in bank-
ing systems, see e.g. Amini et al. (2016), Battiston et al. (2012), Cont et al. (2012), Lehar
(2005). The related issue of systemic risk attribution is addressed in Liu and Staum (2011).
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Avram and Minca (2017), Blanchet and Shi (2012), Kley et al. (2016) extend the appli-
cation field of the network framework to insurance-reinsurance markets. Network models
for systemic risk have the advantage of being both structural (they integrate explicitly the
details of banks’ balance sheets and the interbank exposures) and tractable. Such features
are crucial for determining best responses to systemic crisis. An example in this sense is
Rogers and Veraart (2012), who use networks as decision tools for the establishment of
rescue consortia.
Our contribution is within the area of systemic risk management. We use network
models to investigate a government’s problem of optimal intervention in the form of equity
infusions. This problem is motivated by the government interventions during the recent
crisis, which took forms of recapitalizations, see e.g. Swagel (2009), Veronesi and Zingales
(2010). The rationale and the net gain from these equity infusion programs is an important
topic in the finance literature, both empirical and theoretical, see Bayazitova and Shivdasani
(2012), Philippon and Schnabl (2009), Philippon and Skreta (2010), Veronesi and Zingales
(2010). Several possible reasons for equity infusion programs have been advanced in this
literature (see Veronesi and Zingales (2010)). One theory is that government recapitalized a
banking sector that restricted lending because of debt overhang. The resulting optimization
program has been investigated in Philippon and Schnabl (2009).
The second possible reason is that government intervened in order to prevent runs by
short term creditors, since runs destroy value and are inefficient. Runs by short term
creditors played a central role during the crisis, see Gorton and Metrick (2012a). In this
paper we investigate this rationale.
Some of the questions we ask are: Is an equity infusion program such as the British equity
infusion program or the US CPP (Capital Purchase Program) of 2008 justified in terms of the
net gains when we take into account the runs of short term creditors? How does the optimal
decision depend on the percentage of banks that use short term funding? Is the intervention
budget constraint saturated at the optimal solution?1 To answer these questions, we build
a model in which runs by short term creditors can be triggered by failures of connected
banks. We set up an optimal equity infusion program by a government with constrained
budget who aims at minimizing the total loss in the system. The loss is defined as the total
capital of the failed banks, plus the write-downs recorded by surviving banks. The general
model of failure propagation incorporates a bank run component on top of an insolvency
component. The bank run component lowers the contagion threshold. The underlying
network of exposures transmits losses among financial institutions, which then see their
capital depleted and consequently may face bank runs even if they are solvent. The failure
due to bank runs of some participants prompts more write-downs to their counterparties,
leading to more contagion. Importantly, our model features a channel of indirect contagion.
Increases in the cost of funding and possible runs can happen even in absence of exposures
to failed banks, as short-term lenders may become skeptical to all short-term borrowers.
Our perspective on the relation between insolvency risk and liquidity risk differs and thus
complements the recent literature on funding liquidity. While, similarly to the recent single-
bank funding liquidity risk models as He and Xiong (2012), Liang et al. (2013), Minca and
Wissel (2015), Morris and Shin (2009), the risk of insolvency prompts creditors to withdraw
1In the US, the intervention budget is imposed to the government by Congress vote, and therefore it is
important to determine in a quantitative model whether this constraint is saturated.
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funding, in our paper the insolvency risk is carried through the network. Previous models
are single-bank models in which the focus is on the interaction of the short term creditors
and in which the illiquidity barrier as a function of the capital is endogenous. Here, this
function is exogenous, while insolvency risk comes from “far-away” in the network.
We assume that banks cannot refuse the decision of the government2.
We analyze two information settings. The first setting provides computational tools
for the choice of a set of banks of minimal intervention cost and which can stabilize the
network. The partial information case is highly stylized and intended to provide qualitative
answers to the questions we stated above.
First, in the complete information setting, the controller observes the entire interbank
exposure network. We show in Proposition 1 that the optimal equity infusion problem
becomes a combinatorial optimization problem. This problem is tractable for networks
of realistic sizes, several dozens of nodes, and with arbitrary structure. The idea is that
complete information on the network reveals the causal structure of failures, that is, which
banks fail because of bankruptcies of others. Therefore, we explore the intervention cost
of insuring subsets of nodes, with the understanding that this leads to a modified causal
structure of failures.
In our numerical examples, we find that the solution does not saturate the budget
constraint. This result indicates that there is a tipping point, beyond which intervention
is no longer optimal. it would, in effect, transfer the losses from the existing creditors
and shareholders of failed banks to the taxpayer. The results in the complete information
setting are given in the case of zero recovery rates, but can be extended to other recovery rate
models such as Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Rogers and Veraart (2012). The combinatorial
aspect becomes relevant when the continuum of losses of the seminal paper by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) is lost. This continuum is lost as soon as there are fixed and important
bankruptcy costs, see e.g. Amini et al. (2016), Rogers and Veraart (2012). This aspect is
highly relevant to systemic crisis which have an illiquidity component (such as the crisis of
2007− 2009).
In the second part of the paper we propose a partial information setting, where the
controller observes the interbank exposure network in continuous time. Information about
balance sheets is revealed progressively, when banks record their exposures to failed banks.
We stylize the network model to obtain numerical tractability. The network is regular in
structure, all nodes having the same degrees. The inhomogeneity in the model stems from
the stability of the funding across banks. When intervention is adapted to the information
given by the partial observation of the contagion cluster and, under certain assumptions
on the distribution of the timing of when new information is learned, the cascade model is
shown to become a search model. The recording of an exposure to a failed bank appears to
a partial network observer as the result of a search process: A failed bank (belonging to the
observed set of failed banks) will “search” for a counterparty, with a probability depending
on banks’ connectivities and their number of already recorded exposures. The search process
2During the 2008 crisis, amid the Capital Purchase Program, the US banks that received equity infusions
did not have the option to refuse the government decision, see e.g. Landler and Dash (2008), Veronesi and
Zingales (2010). The Capital Assistance Program (CAP) replaced the Capital Purchase Program in 2009,
offering participating banks redemption options. CAP securities valuation is investigated in Glasserman and
Wang (2011).
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is a Markov process, which consists of bilateral interactions between a failed bank and one
of its counterparties. The successive interaction times correspond to the times when write-
downs are recorded. To prove the equivalence in law of the cascade and the search process,
we need to make an extension of the coupling argument in Amini et al. (2016) to the case
of continuous time and adapted control. Our result in this setting, Theorem 1, allows us to
study the cascade dynamics using a Markov Decision Process.
Our results point to a strong dependence of the optimal intervention policy on the proportion
of banks that use unstable short-term funding. The main takeaway message within the
partial information setting is that, the presence of even a small proportion of banks using
unstable funding will prompt the optimizing government to inject equity in banks that are
otherwise solvent, in order to prevent a run by short term creditors.
We define the net gain from intervention as the difference between the magnitude of
losses due to financial contagion with and without intervention, net of the cost to the gov-
ernment. We find that optimal intervention significantly mitigates financial contagion, both
in the complete and partial information setting. We finally assess the value of information,
namely the difference in the net gain from intervention between the complete and the partial
information case. We find that the value of information is limited, as the net gain under
partial information compares well with the net gain under complete information.
We show the net gain under partial information is due to a large extent to the avail-
ability of an adapted intervention strategy. Indeed, we further compare the net gain from
intervention in two cases: First, the government observes the spread of distress continuously
and adapts their strategy to the flow of information. Second, we restrict the government to
optimally injecting equity only once after the exogenous shock applied to the system. We
find that, the net gain is significantly larger in the first case, thereby justifying multiple
infusions in the same bank, as it was the case in 2008.
In recent work, Amini et al. (2015) have investigated other types of interventions, namely
those by a lender of last resort. The results in Amini et al. (2015) clearly point to the
relation between the value of the financial system (defined there the sum of all external
projects), connectivity and optimal intervention. Up to a certain connectivity, the value
of the financial system increases with connectivity. This implies that a connected system
prone to contagion and thus depending on intervention is preferable to a disconnected
system. However, this is no longer the case if connectivity becomes too large and even
in the case there is intervention, the value of the system may fall below the value of the
disconnected system. In Minca and Sulem (2014) the problem of optimal intervention is
treated in the context of Eisenberg and Noe (2001), and the authors show that it may be
optimal to restrict intervention to a subset of the banks.
In contrast, here we compare the two settings - partial and complete, and the main
driver of the equity infusions is the existence of inefficient bank runs. It is the probability
of bank runs that plays an important role in the case of incomplete information and leads
the controller to have preventive infusions on otherwise well capitalized banks.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a model for distress
propagation in a network of financial institutions that are prone both to bank runs and to
insolvency. The cascade dynamics in presence of the two channels of distress propagation
and under intervention of a government is defined in Section 2.2. In Section 3, we study the
complete information setting. We study the partial information setting in Section 4. The
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Short-term debt
External assets (Illiquid) (net of liquid reserves)
s(i)
Interbank liabilities
Interbank assets
∑
j e(j, i)∑
j e(i, j) Capital
c(i)
Assets Liabilities
Table 1: Stylized balance sheet of a bank.
numerical results in Section 5 compare the different information settings and the respective
net gains from intervention of a government. Section 6 concludes. The paper finishes with
a technical appendix providing the list of notations and the proofs.
2 Distress propagation in a financial network
2.1 Interlinked balance sheets
At a fixed time, say time 0, a financial system is represented as a network (N , e), with
N := {1, . . . , n} the set of financial institutions (banks). For any two financial institutions
i and j, e(i, j) represents the exposure of i to j, i.e., the write-down of i’s capital if j were
to failure. The exposures e(i, j) may encompass several types of liabilities and contracts,
including interbank loans or financial derivatives. Taking into account all possible liabilities
between the two counterparties i and j would involve a multi-layer analysis of the financial
network, see e.g. Bookstaber and Kenett (2016). This is not the aim of the present paper
and we focus on one representative layer.
The asset of one party is the liability of another party. If e(i, j) > 0, we also say that j
has a liability to i. The total interbank assets of i are given by
∑
j e(i, j), while the total
interbank liabilities of i are given by
∑
j e(j, i). We denote by s(i) the total short term
debt on the balance sheet, net of the banks’ liquid reserves. If s(i) is positive, then the
bank depends on refinancing this net short term debt, and consequently it is prone to bank
runs. In this case we let f(i) the short term funding capacity of bank i, i.e., the amount of
short term debt that it can refinance on the market. If s(i) is negative, then the bank does
not need to refinance this short term debt, and consequently it is not prone to bank runs.
It can only failure due to insolvency.
We assume that the bank’s external assets are illiquid. It is for simplicity and without
loss of generality that we assume zero external debt, and such debt could easily be added
to the liability side of a banks’ balance sheet.
We let c(i) the capital of bank i, defined as the total value of assets minus the total value
of liabilities. Table 1 represents a snapshot of the balance sheet of bank i.
Definition 1. A bank i is said to fail if the either one of following two conditions holds:
(i) Balance-sheet insolvency: The total value of its assets is smaller than the total
value of its liabilities, i.e. c(i) < 0;
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(ii) Illiquidity: The net short term debt cannot be refinanced, i.e., f(i) < s(i).
When setting the above illiquidity condition, we assume that the cannot liquidate the
asset to repay this debt. We stress that s(i) is short term debt net of the liquid assets of
the bank. Therefore, having more liquid assets amounts to lower net short term debt, and
thus lower chances that the inequality f(i) < s(i) holds.
Assumption 1. We make the following assumptions:
(i) The bank does not sell the illiquid assets;
(ii) The bank cannot claim back its long-term interbank assets;
(iii) The bank is not acting at the same time a short term lender and a short term borrower.
The first assumption states that there is no market for the illiquid asset.3 This is a
conservative setting in which banks avoid fire sales in order to avoid further asset declines
and, therefore, equity depletion. In times of distress many institutions do not sell at fire-
sale prices to avoid the obligation to record a loss, even if they are close to failure, see e.g.
Diamond and Rajan (2011).
The second assumption states that long-term debtors do not repay their debt prior to
maturity. Indeed, during a crisis, banks have been shown to hoard on liquidity, see e.g.
Acharya and Skeie (2011), Gale and Yorulmazer (2011), so it is reasonable to assume that
they have no incentive to pay back debt before it is due.
The third assumption is a tractability assumption. If banks acted at the same time as
both short term lenders and short term borrowers, then, if unable to refinance the short term
debt they could withdraw funding from their own short term borrowers. Our assumption
insulates our analysis from modeling the decision of each short term lender whether or not
to withdraw funding. The assumption that short term borrowers and lenders are disjoint is
in line with e.g, Geanakoplos (2010), Simsek (2012) where short term debt is taken on by
firms with limited wealth but who are optimistic about the future prospects of the illiquid
asset, while it is provided by firms who are pessimistic about the value of the illiquid asset.
2.2 Distress propagation with intervention
We consider that there exists a government that makes equity infusions in the form of
cash. The government has a constrained budget M and their objective is to minimize the
magnitude of contagion (expressed as total loss) in the financial system.
Our model is of a short term contagion, in which case recovery rates are low because
assets cannot be liquidated fast. For simplicity, we set recovery rates to zero. The cascade
of failures is to be interpreted as a causal structure of failures. Under complete informa-
tion on exposures, the cascade is understood as instantaneous, whereas under incomplete
information the causal structure will be revealed over time.
3 The Troubled Asset Relief Program, before becoming an equity infusion program, was set up as an
asset purchase program to avoid fire-sales of illiquid assets.
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Distress propagation begins with an exogenous set of banks D0, called fundamental
failures, that are either insolvent or illiquid following a shock.
D0 = {i ∈ N | c(i) < 0 or f(i) < s(i)}. (1)
We consider that, after the exogenous shock, the government injects equity ξ(i) ∈
[0,M ] in all banks which have not failed after the exogenous shock, i.e., i ∈ Dc0, where c
denotes set complement. In this section it is helpful to think of as a deterministic quantity
ξ(i) ≥ 0 that is injected instantaneously.4
After intervention, bank i ∈ Dc0 holds capital c(i) + ξ(i). We now describe the cascading
failures triggered by the set D0 of fundamentally failed banks. Let us first describe the
contagion mechanism. There are three sources of contagion in the model. First, a creditor
of failed bank is affected by the direct balance-sheet loss (write-down). The failure of an
institution j leads to a loss equal to e(i, j) to its counterparty i. If the new capital of i
reaches the failure barrier, then i fails. Second, any creditor of a failed bank will be also
affected by the changes in funding conditions: A fraction of its own short-term creditors
that concerned by bank i’s decreased capital withdraw funds. Third, all banks depending on
short term borrowing, irrespective of being a creditor of the failed bank or not, are affected
by changes in the funding conditions, due to the depletion of the risk bearing capital of the
financial system.
We capture the bank run component of the contagion mechanism by assuming that the
short term funding capacity is a function of the bank’s capital and of the number of failed
banks: f(i) = f(c(i), |D|) gives the short term funding capacity of bank i when the set of
failed banks is D ⊆ N . This assumption is consistent with structural models of bank runs
He and Xiong (2012), Liang et al. (2013), Minca and Wissel (2015), Morris and Shin (2009)
where liquidity is a function of capital and bank runs happen when the capital (usually
assumed a stochastic process) reaches a barrier.
We assume that the function f is non-negative, increasing in the first argument (the
capital), and decreasing in the second argument (the number of failures in the system). The
condition of illiquidity (given a failure set D) in Definition 1 writes as
c(i) < f−1(s(i), |D|),
where f−1 represents the inverse (in the first argument) of the debt capacity function f . The
parallel of the insolvency condition and the illiquidity condition is now apparent: insolvency
happens when capital drops below zero, while illiquidity happens when capital drops below
a barrier f−1(s(i), |D|) (given a failure set D). The higher the barrier, the more likely it is to
fail. The larger the size of the failure set, the higher is the barrier. Equity infusions, in turn,
decrease the failure barrier, because the function f−1 is increasing in its first argument.
If s(i) ≤ 0, i.e, the liquid reserves are larger than the short term debt, then the bank
cannot fail due to illiquidity, and thus f−1(s(i), |D|) = 0, for any failure set D. Otherwise if
s(i) > 0 , the illiquidity barrier is higher than the insolvency barrier, i.e, f−1(s(i), |D|) > 0.
We generically call f−1 the failure barrier, which is either an insolvency barrier if s(i) ≤ 0
4In contrast to the complete information case, in the partial information setting of Section 4, ξ(i) will not
represent an instantaneous investment, but the cumulative injection over an entire time horizon in which
information is revealed.
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or an illiquidity barrier if s(i) > 0, in which case the failure barrier increases with the number
of failures in the system.
Because the bank fails when its capital reaches the failure barrier, its loss absorbing
capacity is c−f−1. This quantity is related to the well known distance to default in Merton
(1974). There it denotes the probability of bankruptcy. Since assets are deterministic, here
we can think of the remaining loss absorbing capacity as a threshold to contagion.
For a bank i ∈ N and a set of failed banks D ⊆ N , the remaining capital of bank i
by
θ(i,D) := c(i)−
∑
j∈D
e(i, j). (2)
We are now able to specify the first round of contagious failures:
D1(ξ) =
i ∈ N | c(i) + ξ(i)−∑
j∈D0
e(i, j) < f−1(s(i), |D0|)
 , (3)
represents the set of banks whose failure is triggered by fundamentally failed banks, either
due to direct balance sheet exposures or because of the changes in funding conditions. Their
remaining capital reaches the failure barrier following the fundamental failures.
We have the following definition of cascading failures:
Definition 2 (Cascading failures). Starting from the set of fundamental failures D0, define
Dk(ξ) for k = 1, . . . , n − 1 as the set of institutions whose remaining capital reaches the
failure barrier following the failures in Dk−1(ξ) :
Dk(ξ) =
i ∈ N | c(i) + ξ(i)− ∑
j∈Dk−1(ξ)
e(i, j) < f−1 (s(i), |Dk−1(ξ)|)
 , (4)
We note that this is a joint cascade of insolvencies and bank runs. We expect that under
realistic scenarios the cascade will not pick up in absence of the bank run component. This
is in line with Glasserman and Young (2015), who find that that cascades of insolvencies
do not pick up in absence of an additional channel of contagion. On the other hand, in
presence of an additional source of contagion they are likely to pick up. Other works that
analyze multiple channels of contagion, in general cross-exposures in a network context and
fire sale externalities, include Aldasoro et al. (2016), Battiston et al. (2016), Cifuentes et al.
(2005), see also Laux and Leuz (2010). The focus of our work is quite different from these
works, as we study the control of this cascade.
Example 1. Suppose that the initial failure set is comprised of two banks and one bank has
an exposure of 2 (units of numéraire) to these banks. If its capital is initially equal to 3,
then after the write-down it becomes 1. If the bank does not depend on short term funding,
then the bank does not fail. However, if the bank depends on short term funding, there may
be a bank run following the write-downs, in which case the bank fails and there is contagion.
9
The previous example shows that a cascade can pick up if some of the banks have small
initial distances to failure, which is equivalent to them having low contagion thresholds.
In particular, inhomogeneous networks may have phase transitions when sufficiently many
nodes have low contagion thresholds, see Amini and Minca (2016). A cascade as defined
above is may pick up in particular if the exposures aggregate several sources (loans, deriva-
tives). More importantly, thresholds for contagion decrease with the number of failures in
the system is a very powerful source of indirect contagion on top of the direct cascade.
Final set of failures. It is easy to see that the cascade is monotonic, i.e. Dk−1(ξ) ⊆
Dk(ξ). Moreover, if the size of the network is n, the cascade finishes in at most n−1 rounds.
The final set of failures is given by
D(ξ) := Dn−1(ξ).
The final set of failures in absence of intervention is D(0) and we clearly have for all
ξ ≥ 0, D(ξ) ⊆ D(0).
If a bank i belongs to the final set of failures, i.e. i ∈ D(ξ), we identify the following
losses:
(i) Loss absorbed by shareholders : c(i) + ξ(i);
(ii) Loss absorbed by counterparties:
∑
j∈D(ξ)c e(j, i).
Since the loss is absorbed by the capital cushion after infusions, it is understood that it
includes the government cost.
Definition 3. We define the loss in the system
L(ξ) :=
∑
i∈D(ξ)
c(i) +
∑
i∈D(ξ)
ξ(i) +
∑
i∈D(ξ)
∑
j∈D(ξ)c
e(j, i). (5)
It is reasonable to assume that the government recapitalizes only banks that have not
failed after the initial shock, i.e., ξ(i) = 0 for all i ∈ D0(ξ). In the next section we will see
that if the government has complete information on balance sheets, then their optimization
program will yield that ξ(i) = 0, for all i ∈ D(ξ). It is important to note that the loss we
expressed above includes any loss that is absorbed by the government cushion of capital
injected in the banks.
In the sequel, we refer to time 0 the time after the fundamental failures, and we consider
that the controller knows the set of fundamental failures at time 0.
We will analyze two specifications for the equity infusion problem. In the complete
information case the controller minimizes the loss in the system, when the network structure
is know (this is a deterministic optimization). In the partial information case, the controller
minimizes the expected loss, when the network structure is only partially observed (this is
a stochastic control problem). The expected value in the latter case is over the linkages in
the network, revealed over time.
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Figure 1: Left: Causal structure of failures without intervention (the arrow represents the
sense of causality). Right: Structure of failures after “insuring” a set of nodes. Chains of
causal failures that pass through insured nodes are removed, and banks are indirectly saved.
3 Optimal intervention with complete network information
We consider a deterministic and static setting for the equity infusion problem in which the
complete information of the interbank structure is available to the government at time 0.
In this case, the cascade (under any equity infusion) can be seen as instantaneous and the
idea is to transform the optimization over the equity infusions into an optimization over
sets of banks that are insured against contagion by equity infusions. The government has
the following optimization problem.
Problem 1 (Optimal equity infusion). We define the problem of optimal equity infusion
with maximum budget M
Minimize
ξ
L(ξ) s.t.
n∑
i=1
ξ(i) ≤M. (6)
The controller will seek a set of banks that maximize stability in the network, in the
sense that insuring these banks removes most causal chains of failures. Figure 1 illustrates
the idea. On the left, a set of fundamental failures leads by causal failure chains to a
final set of failures. On the right, some banks are “insured” and the final set of failures is
smaller. Not only the “insured” banks are removed from the final set of failures, but also
some indirectly saved banks, that would have failed due to causal chains. The “insured”
banks act as buffers and cut the causal failure chains that pass through them.
The equity infusion problem may have multiple solutions. We make the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 2. If there are multiple solutions to the above problem, the government prefers
the solution(s) with minimal total equity infusion.
The rationale of this assumption is apparent in the following example.
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Example 2. We assume a causal chain of failures: the initial failure of 0 leads to the
failure of 1 which leads to the failure of 2. The solution of minimal cost that ensures the
survival of both 1 and 2 is to make an equity infusion in 1 equal to the exposure of 1 to
0. This infusion will automatically save 2. Any solution that would make higher equity
infusions would achieve the same gain, namely the capital of banks 1 and 2. This gain is
the maximum that can be achieved in this network. This example demonstrates why beyond
a certain point, equity infusions may not be efficient. All banks survive here following the
intervention on a smaller subset of banks. We conclude that even under infinite budget, it
is in general not optimal to make equity infusions in all banks.
A more subtle point is that it may also be optimal to let a bank fail, even if there is
infinite budget. The idea is that it may be better to let a bank fail (and have the loss
bounded to the capital of this bank), than save the bank and absorb (with taxpayer money)
the exposures of this bank to the failed banks.
Example 3. Assume that bank 0 is the initial failure, with c(0) = 3. We let c(1) = 3 the
capital of bank 1 and e(1, 0) = 5 the exposure of bank 1 to the failed bank. Further down
the chain, bank 2 has a capital c(2) = 3 and e(2, 1) = 2, the exposure of bank 2 to bank 1.
In absence of intervention, the failure of 0 leads to the failure of 1, while bank 2 survives.
From (5), the total loss in the system is c(0) + c(1) + e(2, 1) = 8, i.e, the capital of the
failed banks plus the exposure of the surviving bank to the failed banks. To save bank 1, the
government needs to inject sufficient funds so that it survives the write-down of e(1, 0). If
needs thus to inject (e(1, 0)− c(1))+ = 2. The loss in the system is now c(0) + e(1, 0) = 8,
i.e, the capital of the failed bank plus the exposure of surviving banks to the failed banks.
The loss is the same as in the case without intervention, but at a cost for the government.
Because we give preference to the minimal equity infusion, the optimal solution is to let 1
fail and 2 absorb the write-down.
If there are multiple solutions of minimal equity infusion, we may add criteria to distin-
guish between the solutions. Such criteria may include in particular the quality and riskiness
of the external assets. Preference towards saving banks with less risky assets can reduce
moral hazard. However, we expect multiple solutions only in presence of rather unnatural
symmetries in the network, for example in presence of banks with an indistinguishable path
of exposures to the initial set of failures. As we will see, in the partial information setting
with linkages revealed over time the problem will have a unique solution because infusions
are made sequentially.
We now show how to choose the set of minimal cost that reduces contagion loss by the
most. We start by the following lemma, which states that either a node is left to fail, in
which case no equity is injected in it, or, if a node is saved, then the equity infusion the
minimal amount needed such that any node is above the failure barrier f−1.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ξ̃ is a solution to Problem 1. Then the following properties hold
(i) If node i does not fail during the cascade, i.e., i ∈ D(ξ̃)c, we have
ξ̃(i) =
 ∑
j∈D(ξ̃)
e(i, j)− c(i) + f−1
(
s(i), |D(ξ̃)|
)+ . (7)
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(ii) If bank i fails under infusion ξ̃, i.e., i ∈ D(ξ̃), then ξ̃(i) = 0.
It is is immediate to check the proof, by considering the basic tradeoff in the loss
function in (5): higher equity infusion ξ may decrease the set of failures D(ξ̃), but increases
the exposure of the government. Therefore, for fixed D(ξ̃), a bank i ∈ D(ξ̃)c receives the
minimum infusion that guarantees that it does not fail, i.e. it “insures” it. If a bank
i ∈ D(ξ̃)c fails under infusion ξ̃, then ξ̃(i) = 0 (otherwise ξ̃ would not be an optimum: by
setting ξ̃(i) = 0, the exposure of the government to i’s failure can be decreased to zero,
while D(ξ̃) would be unchanged.)
We now further characterize those infusions ξ̃ (not necessarily solutions of Problem 1)
which satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1. Let V ⊆ N and consider the following
algorithm, which gives the minimal infusions that insures the set V when only nodes in V
may receive infusions.
Algorithm 1 (Insurance of a set of banks). (i) Let DV the final set of failures, as in
Definition 2, when all banks in V receive infinite equity infusions, and all other banks
do not receive any equity infusions;
(ii) Let now ξV(i) :=
(∑
j∈DV e(i, j)− c(i) + f−1
(
s(i),DV
))+
.
In step one of the algorithm we compute the failure set when banks in V receive infinite
equity infusions. The causal chains of failure are modified, since insured nodes act as
stabilizers, see Figure 1. The fictitious infinite equity infusions serve only to determine the
modified final set of failures DV after we remove the causal chains of failures going through
insured banks. The actual amount of equity infusions needed to insure V is of course not
infinite. This amount is computed in step two of the algorithm, such that the capital of
insured banks survives the exposures to the modified final set of failures.
We will thus use the failure set DV to compute the actual equity infusions in V. The
critical observation is that DV is equal to D(ξV), i.e., the cascade with infinite equity
infusions in V is the same as the cascade with equity infusions ξV . We also have that ξV is
the minimal infusion that insures the set V when only nodes in V receive infusions.
We now can recast the optimal equity infusion problem as a combinatorial optimization
problem.
Proposition 1. Problem 1 can be stated as the following combinatorial optimization prob-
lem, over the set V ⊆ N \ D0 of banks to receive equity infusions:
Minimize
V
∑
i∈D(ξV )
c(i) +
∑
i∈Dc(ξV )
∑
j∈D(ξV )
e(i, j)
subject to
∑
i∈V
ξV(i) ≤M.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix.
Since the set of banks is finite, the combinatorial optimization problem has a solution.
Finding the optimal solution requires however exploring all possible sets V that satisfy the
budget constraint.
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Figure 2
Concerning the uniqueness of the solution, we can construct an example where there
are multiple solutions to the optimization problem. We expect that such examples fea-
ture symmetries in the network structure. In the next example, banks 1 and 2 have an
indistinguishable path to the initial failure, node 0.
Example 4. Consider the network in Figure 2. Node 0 is the initial failure. It causes
the failure of nodes 1 and 2, because each of these node’s exposure to 0 is 1, equal to their
capital. These two nodes, in turn, cause the failure of node 3. Finally, node 3 causes the
failure of node 4. One can note there are two solutions with minimal cost: one can inject 1
in node 1 and save all nodes except for 2, or symmetrically one can inject 1 in node 2 and
save all nodes except for 1. The cost in both case is equal to 1. According to the criteria we
considered so far, nodes 1 and 2 are exchangeable from the point of view of the controller.
In practice, this poses a fairness problem and additional criteria need to be added. For
example, the government can have a preference on the type of assets of the banks. In the
case of multiple solutions, the government could inject equity in banks with the preferred
type of assets. Additional criteria on the quality and riskiness of the assets of banks that
have access to equity infusions will also mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with
equity infusions.
Full information on the network structure allows the government to select the solution
of minimal cost. Because the objective is to minimize losses, then the banks that receive
equity infusions are those that would otherwise lead to the most failures. This in turn
creates an obvious moral hazard problem. Banks would seek to position themselves high in
the causal failure chains, by borrowing from several large counterparties, particularly those
with small distances to failure, e.g., those who fund themselves through short term debt.
This in turn creates fragile networks. We expect that the existence of multiple solutions to
the equity infusion problem would actually lead to less moral hazard, since there could be
ambiguity about the preferred solution.
Data collection on exposures has thus important tradeoffs. In time of distress, it allows
the government to achieve the minimal loss possible given the network. However, because
of the structure of the solution, data collection could turn out to be detrimental to financial
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stability, because banks may create fragile network structures. It is thus imperative that
data collection and the availability of equity infusion programs is accompanied by capital
requirements and charges that disincentivize banks from creating network structures with
potentially large causal default chains. In the next section, we consider the intervention
in presence of partial information. Partial information makes the equity infusions less
predictable for the banks and thus mitigates moral hazard.
4 Optimal intervention with partial network information
In this section, we consider that the complete interbank network is unknown to the controller
from the beginning, but it is revealed over time. At each time t, the controller can decide
(subject to budget constraints) to inject equity in any bank so as to minimize the total
expected loss in the system until the cascade ends.
Contagion begins with the set of fundamental failures D0, which are assumed to be
recorded. Contrary to the full information case when all the write-downs are instantaneous,
there is now a span between a bank’s failure and the time when an exposed counterparty
will record its write-down.
The government observes all failures and the recorded exposures to failed banks. The
providers of short term debt learn the same information as the government, but with a delay
that would allow intervention before a bank run. To motivate this assumption, consider
that bank i is about to reach the illiquidity barrier f−1 = 1 after a write-down. If the
market observed the write-down before the government, then the run ensues and the bank
fails. It cannot be then saved by intervention, even if the government increases its capital
to 2 (above the failure barrier). However, if the government observes the write-down before
the market, then it can make the capital infusion and the bank run does not occur because
the providers of short term debt integrate the information that the government already
made equity infusions, and that the new capital is 2, which is above the failure barrier.
4.1 A random network model
We assume now a regular network, in which all nodes have the same number of linkages.
Heterogeneity in degrees can be introduced and all theoretical results in this section would
still hold under some mild conditions on the degrees. At the same time, heterogeneity in
degrees would increase the dimension of the Markov processes. The problem would remain
tractable for more realistic two-tiered network structures, such as core periphery-networks.
We illustrate the theory on the regular case, and differ the discussion of these extensions
to the end of Section 5. Thus we present the regular case from the outset. We will retain
heterogeneity in the funding stability, and thus the model has the important feature that
the failure barrier is uncertain: zero for banks that do not depend on short term funding
and thus can only fail due to insolvency, and equal to one for banks that do depend on
short term funding. As we will see, this heterogeneity will drive the results.
We endow each node with a number of λ incoming half-links and λ outgoing half-links.
Each link represents one unit of exposure (in terms of the numéraire). The network results
form the uniform matching of all incoming half links and all outgoing half-links. We allow
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for parallel links, with the meaning that the exposures between the same pair of nodes add
up.
We further simplify the problem by setting the failure barrier f−1 constant and equal
to 1 for those banks prone to bank runs. We let α the fraction of banks that are prone to
bank runs. The other banks (representing a fraction 1− α) have a failure barrier equal to
0. We thus have
f−1 =
{
1 with probability α
0 with probability 1− α.
Maximum capital. From now on, we assume that the initial capital is constant across
banks, c(i) = c for all i ∈ N , for c ≤ λ (the capital is smaller than the interbank assets).
Throughout contagion, the remaining capital decreases, so c also represents the maximum
remaining capital.
We consider that, after a recorded failure i, any node j exposed to i will record the
write-down related to its exposure after a random time span, independent of everything
else, and distributed as an exponential random variable with mean 1 (time unit) Exp(1).5
Contagion stops at a random time T , which is finite almost surely (a.s.). Indeed, there will
be at most m (the total number of edges) recorded write-downs due to exposures to failed
banks, and therefore T will be smaller than a sum of m i.i.d. exponentials Exp(1).
We denote by Tk, for k ≤ m, the arrival times of the superposed recorded write-downs
(we take by convention T0 = 0). We denote (ik, jk) the pair of banks whose exposure is
recorded at time Tk, with the usual direction that jk is exposed to ik.
4.2 Optimal intervention
Unlike in the complete information case where all intervention happened at once, here we
assume that the cascading failures and the intervention occur over time.
We let ξt(i) the cumulative equity infusion in bank i up to time t, with ξT the cumulative
equity infusion up to the end of the cascade. We let D(ξ) the final failure set under the
equity infusion ξt, t ≤ T . The optimal equity infusion problem 1 becomes now
Problem 2 (Optimal equity infusion under partial information).
Minimize
ξ
E
[ ∑
i∈D(ξ)
c(i) +
∑
i∈D(ξ)
ξT (i) +
∑
i∈D(ξ)c
∑
j∈D(ξ)
e(i, j)
]
, (8)
subject to
n∑
i=1
ξT (i) ≤M. (9)
Note that, contrary to the complete information setting, the second term is not neces-
sarily zero, since it is possible that the government injects equity in a bank that afterwards
could record additional write-downs and fail. In the numerical results, we consider the
difference between the loss without intervention and the loss under the optimal interven-
tion, which is our criterion for the assessment of the equity infusion program. The “wasted
5The exponential distribution of the random time span is a tractability assumption.
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government money” term E
(∑
i∈D(ξ) ξT (i)
)
is part of our criterion, allowing us to cap-
ture the tradeoff associated with intervention: potentially wasted money versus less capital
depletion.
The solution to this problem can be given in terms of a Markov Decision Process for
the embedded Markov chain, i.e., it is sufficient to determine the optimal intervention only
at the times when the write-downs are recorded. The Markov Decision Process is based on
partitioning the set of banks according their remaining capital.
The next proposition states that intervention only occurs at the random times Tk when
write-downs are recorded. A bank i may receives infusions only when it records an exposure
to a failed bank and when the government decides to reinforce the capital of the exposed
bank.
Proposition 2. The optimal solution to the Problem 2 is for all i ∈ N ,
ξ̃t(i) =
∑
k, Tk≤t, ik=i
uk,
where uk ∈ {0, 1} represents the equity infusion at time Tk in the exposed bank ik. We have
the budget constraint
∑
k, Tk≤T uk ≤M .
The proof of this proposition is given as part of the proof of a technical Lemma 2 in the
Appendix.
We can describe contagion in our model using a Markov Decision Process. What deter-
mines whether a bank fails, is whether either its distance to the illiquidity barrier is zero (if
the bank uses unstable sources of funding) or its distance to insolvency is zero (if the bank
does not use unstable sources of funding).
Recall that contagion starts from fundamental failures and that the counterparties of
failed nodes record their exposures after random exponential times. Thanks to the uniform
matching, a recorded exposure belongs to a counterparty of a failed node with probability
proportional to the number of unrecorded exposures of that counterparty. A node with an
exposure to a recorded failure, will have its remaining capital decrease.
Finally, remark that, from point of view of the government, nodes that have the same
connectivity and remaining capital represent the same type. Therefore, we only need to
keep track of their number during the cascade, rather than their individual state, which is
a significant reduction in the dimension of the Markov process.
We make now this intuition mathematically precise. At time t ≤ T , the state variables
are
• Xt(θ), θ = 1, . . . , c: the number of banks with remaining capital equal to θ at time t,
• Nt(θ), θ = 1, . . . , c: the number of interventions up to time t on banks with remaining
capital θ (at the time of intervention).
Thanks to Proposition 2, the control variables are
uk := (uk(θ)),
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giving the 0/1 infusion decision corresponding to intervention at k-th event (at time Tk) on
banks with remaining capital θ.
We let Xt := (Xt(θ))θ=1,...,c and Nt := (Nt(θ))θ=1,...,c. By abuse of notation, we will use
from now on the embedded controlled Markov chain (as a function not of time but of the
recorded exposure)
Xk := XTk , and Nk := NTk .
The transition probabilities of this embedded Markov chain are given in Appendix A.2.2.
Note that by Proposition 2, the optimal strategy consists in injecting liquidity at the
random times Tk, i.e., as soon as exposures are recorded, and, moreover, the amount of
these interventions are either 0 or 1.
By virtue of the theorem 1 below, the optimal intervention problem in continuous time
(Problem 2) reduces to the following optimization problem in discrete time 0, 1, . . . ,m.
Problem 3 (Optimization program in discrete time).
Vk(x, `) := min
uk(θ)∈{0,1}
Lk(x, `)
subject to
c∑
θ=1
Nm(θ) ≤M,
with
Lk(x, `) := E
[
c(n−
c∑
θ=1
Xm(θ)) +
c−1∑
θ=1
(c− θ)Xm(θ) +
c−1∑
θ=1
Nm(θ) | Xk = x,Nk = `
]
.
The quantity Lk(x, `) represents the expected loss at the end of the cascade, assuming
that at step k there have been j interventions and the system is in state x, i.e., Xk(θ) = x(θ),
for all θ = 1, . . . , c. Just as in Equation (5) the loss consists of the capital of the failed
banks c(n −
∑c
θ=1Xm(θ)), as well as the loss absorbed by surviving banks (including the
loss absorbed by the new equity)
∑c−1
θ=1(c − θ)Xm(θ) +
∑c−1
θ=1Nm(θ). For example, each
bank at distance c − 1 at the end of the cascade absorbed one unit of loss from their own
capital.
A solution exists for Problem 3, since the state space is discrete and finite, as well as the
time horizon. Uniqueness follows due to the uniqueness of the solution to the associated
dynamic programming equation, given in section A.2.4. Formally, we have:
Proposition 3. There exists an unique solution to the stochastic control Problem 3, given
by a Markovian optimal control ũ:
Vk(x, `) := min
uk(θ)∈{0,1}
Lk(x, `),
= L
(ũ)
k (x, `).
We now state the main technical result of this section, which links the Markovian optimal
control ũ and the equity infusion problem 1.
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Theorem 1. The optimal solution to Problem 2 is given by V0(X0, 0) and the optimal
strategy is determined by the Markovian optimal control (ũ) as
ξ̃t(i) =
∑
k, Tk≤t, ik=i
ũk(θk(i)),
for i ∈ N , where θk(i) is the remaining capital of node i at step k.
The proof is given in Appendix A.2.3. This result will allow us to study the optimal
solution numerically, using dynamic programming.
4.3 The value of adapted intervention in the partial information setting
We end this section by a technical result, that allows to compute the optimal intervention in
the case when the corresponding budget is used at time 0 to increase the capital of certain
banks. We denote by V̂0 the value function when we restrict intervention to be made at
time 0. As before, the objective is to minimize the expected loss during the cascade. The
value of adapted intervention is defined as the difference V0(X0, 0)− V̂0.
It is easy to see that the value V̂0 results as an optimization problem in dimension c,
over the increases in the initial distances to insolvency, under budget constraints. Let us
denote by ∆X the increase in the initial number of banks at different distances to insolvency.
Remark that the risk bearing capacity of the system is given by the total capitalization of
the financial system:
∑c
θ=1X(θ)θ.
The capital infusion will increase the risk bearing capacity of the system. After interven-
tion, individual banks will have increased their capital, therefore the increase in the initial
number of banks at different distances to insolvency verify
∑
k≥1 ∆X(k) = 0, since the
number of fundamentally failed banks does not change. Moreover, banks can only increase
their distances to failure after intervention: for all 2 ≤ θ ≤ c,
∑
k>θ ∆X(k) ≥ 0.
Thus, we have the following technical result, which allows us to study numerically the
value of adapted control.
Proposition 4. The solution of the optimization Problem 2 when we restrict intervention
to be made at time 0, i.e, ξT (i) = ξ0(i), for all i, is given by
V̂0 = min
∆X
E(L | X0 + ∆X)
subject to:
c∑
θ=1
∆X(θ) · d ≤M,∑
k≥1
∆X(k) = 0, and
∑
k≥θ
∆X(k) ≥ 0 for all 2 ≤ θ ≤ c.
5 Numerical results
In this section we will compare the net gain from intervention in various settings, where
the net gain is understood as the difference between loss without intervention and loss with
intervention. The net gain from intervention will be expressed as a percentage of total
value of the financial system, where we define the total value of the financial system
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Figure 3: Configuration model: Links of are formed by uniformly matching half edges.
Number of banks n = 20
Connectivity λ = 12
Initial capital (also maximum remaining capital) c = 3
Fraction of banks depending on unstable short term debt α = 0.2
Intervention budget M = 6
Table 2: Baseline parameters.
as the sum over all banks of their capital, i.e.,
∑
i∈N c(i). We are particularly interested in
comparing the gain from intervention in the partial information and complete information
case. The difference in the net gain is the value of information. A cautionary point is that
this value of information does not integrate moral hazard, which we expect to be higher in
the case of complete information.
In the complete information case, we choose uniformly 2 banks as initial failures. We
check robustness of the results by generating a regular network and an inhomogeneous
network. By means of the configuration model, see e.g. Molloy and Reed (1995), we obtain
sample networks in which the nodes have prescribed degrees. Nodes are assigned in-coming
and out-going ”half-linkages” and the sample graph results from a uniform matching model
of the in-coming half linkages and out-going half linkage, as shown in Figure 3. The regular
network is a network in which all nodes have the same degree λ = 12.
Likewise, an inhomogeneous sample network is obtained by the configuration model,
but the degrees are not all equal to λ. They are instead chosen randomly, equal to λmin = 6
or λmax = 18 each with probability .5, such that the average degree remains λ = 12. In
a regular network, each bank can be reached from other λ banks and can reach other λ
banks. When λ is large by comparison the n, we can expect that the graph is strongly
connected and that it contains cycles (with sufficiently high probability). The same holds
in the case of the inhomogeneous graph when λmin is sufficiently large by comparison the
n. The numerical results of this section depend on the strong connectivity property of the
networks we consider.
In the partial information setting we do not need to choose the banks that fail initially,
but only their number. We will consider the cases of 1 and 2 initial failures (out of 20
banks).
The partition of non-failed banks according to the remaining capital can be interpreted
in the following way:
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• θ = 3: Banks which are not prone to bank runs in case they record a write-down;
• θ = 2: Banks that recorded one write-down. Among these banks, those who depend
on short term funding will face a bank run as soon as they record a new write-down;
• θ = 1: Banks that recorded two write-downs. They do not depend on short term debt
(A non-failed bank that depends on short term debt cannot have remaining capital
θ = 1, since it fails due to illiquidity as soon as its remaining capital reaches the failure
barrier f−1 = 1).
Before contagion (after the initial shock), non-failed banks have remaining capital θ = 3.
If there is additional depletion of capital beyond the initial failures, we will allow non-failed
banks to start with θ = 2 in order to illustrate the effect of contagion.
5.1 Optimal intervention in the complete information setting
We generate several samples from our random network model with the parameters in Table
2. Figure 4 plots the net gain from intervention versus the total equity infusion. Each point
represents one of the sets of “insured” banks. We plot the cost versus the net gain for all
possible choices of insured sets of banks, for which the infusion is smaller than M .
More precisely, we are in the context of Proposition 1 and we plot for each set of
“insured” banks V ⊆ N \D0 with
∑
i∈V ξ
V(i) ≤M the cost
∑
i∈V ξ
V(i) versus the net gain∑
i∈D(ξV )
c(i) +
∑
i∈Dc(ξV )
∑
j∈D(ξV )
e(i, j)−
( ∑
i∈D(0)
c(i) +
∑
i∈Dc(0)
∑
j∈D(0)
e(i, j)
)
,
where D(0) represents the final set of failed banks under no intervention (0 equity infusions).
If the net gain from insuring a set of banks is positive, then it is efficient to intervene on
that set. However, the government will chose to insure the set with the maximal net gain.
If there are multiple optimal solutions, we choose the one of minimal cost.
We make three plots, for the same network, but for different α (the probability that
a node depends on short term funding). For each of these plots, we note that the net
gain is in general decreasing with the cost of insurance. To understand this unintuitive
result, consider the example of a long chain of causal defaults: 1 leads to the default of 2,
which leads to the default of 3, and so on, until the default of last bank 20. In absence of
intervention all 20 banks default. However, the causal structure of defaults is particularly
simple here, and its complete knowledge will let the controller identify that there is only
one bank, 1, that has a critical position in the network. Saving this bank will have the
smallest intervention cost, 1 and lead to the maximum net gain equal to the capital of 20
banks. When the cost to insure a set of banks is small, this means that most causal chains
would be removed if only a few critical banks receive infusions.
The second observation from Figure 4 is that the optimal solution is not very sensitive
to the fraction of banks prone to bank runs. Only when the fraction of such banks increases
significantly, the cost of the optimal solution increases from 4 to 5. The net gain is the
same. Clearly, because in the complete information the controller can identify the critical
nodes in the network that need to be insured, then the default chains are cut ”early” before
an illiquidity crisis can unfold.
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Figure 4: Net gain from intervention vs. total equity infusion, α = 0, 0.2, 0.4 and no indirect
contagion. Each point represents a set V that are insured. The net gain is represented as a
percentage of total value of the financial system.
Third, as expected, the general cost to insure sets of nodes increases with the fraction
α of banks prone to bank runs. This is explained by the fact that there are less choices
of insurable sets that can satisfy the budget constraint. However, because the optimal
solution is interior and not very sensitive to the fraction α of banks prone to bank runs,
then increasing the intervention budget will not lead to a better solution.
Further, we let α = 0.2 and plot the cases when there is a dependence of the illiquidity
barrier and the number of defaults in the system. The first plot is the case when there is
no dependence, the second one is when the illiquidity barrier increases by 1 with every 5
defaults in the system, and the last case when the illiquidity barrier increases by 1 with
every 2 defaults in the system. The optimal solution has now a higher cost 6. As the indirect
contagion channel becomes more powerful, much fewer sets are “insurable”. The sensitivity
is much larger to the indirect contagion channel than to the increase in the fraction α of
banks prone to bank runs.
In all considered cases, beyond a certain value for the total capital infusion, it is not
optimal for the government to inject more equity in the system. The budget constraint is
not saturated in general. This suggests that injecting equity beyond a certain limit would,
in effect, not serve to mitigate the contagious losses, but to transfer losses from the creditors
and existing shareholders of failed banks to the taxpayers.
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Figure 5: Net gain from intervention vs. total equity infusion; α = 0.2: In the first plot
there is no indirect contagion, in the second and third plot there is indirect contagion: the
barrier increases by 1 every 5 and respectively 2 defaults. Each point represents a set V
that are insured. The net gain is represented as a percentage of total value of the financial
system.
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous network. Net gain from intervention vs. total equity infusion,
α = 0, 0.2, 0.4, indirect contagion in the last plot. Each point represents a set V that are
insured. The net gain is represented as a percentage of total value of the financial system.
We now check the robustness of these results with respect to the network structure. We
have so far considered a regular network. We now consider intervention in an inhomogeneous
network in Figure 6. The network is obtained by the configuration model, but the degrees
are not all equal to λ. They are instead chosen randomly, equal to λmin = 6 or λmax = 18
each with probability .5, such that the average degree remains λ = 12.
The same results hold qualitatively, with two important distinctions. Unlike in homoge-
nous networks, in heterogeneous networks there is no contagion in absence of the bank run
component. The maximal gain that can be achieved is 0.4 (compared to 0.5) of the value of
the financial system. This is because there is less contagion in the first place. The second
distinction is that in heterogeneous networks there are more cases in which the net gain from
intervention is negative. This is because in such networks, exposures are heterogeneous. Or,
as seen in Example 3, in presence of large exposures the government will not save a bank
and absorb a large exposure with taxpayer money, according to our optimization criterion.
Given that the networks we consider here have n = 20 nodes, it is reasonable to interpret
these nodes as core banks. While the entire financial system is highly heterogeneous, the
subset of core banks is more homogenous in term of connectivities. In the sequel, we consider
the partial information setting, in which the network is homogenous and in fact regular.
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5.2 Optimal intervention in the partial information setting
We compare in Figure 7 the net gain from intervention in the complete and partial infor-
mation setting. Given complete information on the network, the loss mitigation will be
more effective. Here we study numerically the value of information, defined the difference
between the value function in the complete versus the incomplete information case. Poli-
cymakers would need to balance the value of information against the costs associated with
the complete information case: the costs of data collection and the moral hazard costs.
The complete information case is shown as before, and the optimal solution is easy to
identify on the plots as the maximum net gain. In the incomplete information case we plot
the expected net gain as a function of α and the number of banks with remaining capital
θ = 2. Because we consider that non-failed banks have either θ = 3 or θ = 2 remaining
capital, it is understood that the larger the number of banks with remaining capital θ = 2,
the smaller the initial capitalization of the non-failed banks.
We note that optimal intervention reduces significantly the magnitude of contagion, in
both the complete and partial information settings whenever α is small and there are few
banks with remaining capital θ = 2. The resulting net gain in the partial information setting
compares well to the case when the government observes the whole network. In both the
complete information and the partial information the gain is close to .5 of the value of the
system. Importantly however, for the partial information case, this large gain holds only
for small values of α, whereas in the previous section the dependence on α of the optimal
solution was not as significant.
This points to the fact that an optimal intervention of a government “one step ahead” of
the market yields good results in terms of mitigating contagion when the fraction of banks
prone to bank runs is small and most non-failed banks are well capitalized initially. The
fact that the value of information is small is particularly important from the perspective
that the government needs to put into balance the value of information with the increase in
moral hazard when the network structure is known (full information on who would receive
infusions). Moreover, data collection is costly, see e.g. Abad et al. (2016) for details on the
amount of data availability and the costs this data collection entails.
We further compare the optimal solution under partial information with the solution
when we constrain equity infusions to take place only once. The difference is the value
of an adaptive strategy. Figure 8 shows that the adapted intervention strategy performs
significantly better than an infusion constrained to take place at time 0.
5.3 Short term debt and interbank contagion
In this section we assess the intervention policy in presence of banks which depend on
unstable sources of funding. We vary the proportion α of banks that fund themselves via
short term debt. In figure 9 we plot the net gain from intervention as a function of the
number of banks at remaining capital θ = 2 and as a function of α. The more banks at
remaining capital 2 (as opposed to 3) the less capital of non-failed banks. We consider
two cases, with one initial failure and with two initial failures. For each of these cases, we
compare the net gain under two intervention budgets, M = 10 and M = 4.
Consider the case of one initial default and M = 4. For low α, the net gain increases
with the number of banks at remaining capital θ = 2; this is because contagion can be
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Figure 7: Net gain from intervention: complete vs. partial information.
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Figure 8: Difference between value functions in the case with all equity infusions at time 0
and the case with adaptive intervention. M = 10 and there is one initial failure.
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Figure 9: Expected net gain from intervention, for one and respectively two initial failures.
For each plot, we consider the intervention budget M = 10 (surface above) vs. M = 4
(surface below).
contained with the allocated budget. When α is large, the net gain quickly decreases with
the number of banks at remaining capital θ = 2; when there is a large number of such
banks, the net gain is close to zero; this means that contagion under intervention is almost
the same as without intervention.
For M = 10, contagion can be better contained, so the expected net gain remains large
even for a large α and a large number of banks with remaining capital θ = 2.
This is no longer true in the case of two initial defaults. Then the expected net gain is
sharply decreasing with α and the number of banks at remaining capital θ = 2 even under
the larger budget M = 10.
In Figure 10 we plot the difference between the expected number of interventions on
banks with remaining capital θ = 2 and interventions on banks with remaining capital
θ = 1, as a function of α and time. More interventions on banks with remaining capital
θ = 2 means that the focus is on avoiding runs. More interventions on banks with remaining
capital θ = 1 means that the focus is on avoiding insolvencies. Whenever banks are not
prone to illiquidity (α = 0) the government has no incentive to inject equity before the bank
is in actual danger of insolvency.
All plots in Figure 10 have a jump at α = 0. This means that as soon as there is even
a small fraction of banks that depend on short term funding, there is a threat that short
term creditors can withdraw funding and the banks could fail due to illiquidity. In this
case the government cannot wait for the banks to reach θ = 1 to make equity infusions,
because it fears failures due to bank runs on banks that are still solvent. The government
chooses instead to make equity infusions in banks that have θ = 2. These are banks that
are adequately capitalized but which can fail due to runs, and not insolvency.
When there is one initial default, the strategies are indistinguishable for M = 10 and
M = 6. When there are two initial defaults, the switch (the aforementioned jump at α = 0)
towards interventions to prevent bank runs are much swifter when the intervention budget
is larger. We conclude that under partial information, and in contrast with the complete
information case, a larger intervention budget allows the government to take better decisions
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and avoid illiquidity crises. Whenever there are banks which depend on short term funding,
the primary reason for equity infusions is to eliminate the frictions associated to inefficient
bank runs, and not to prevent insolvency. An important observation is that it suffices to
have an arbitrarily small α to observe this sharp jump in the rationale of the intervention
policy.
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Figure 10: Difference between the expected number of interventions on banks with remain-
ing capital θ = 2 and θ = 1 for budget M = 10 (surface above), M = 6 (surface in the
middle) and M = 4 (surface below). With one initial default (left), the strategies are in-
distinguishable for M = 10 and M = 6. The negative region of each surface represents
the case when the controller’s focus is on preventing insolvencies, and the positive region of
each surface represents the case when the controller’s focus is on preventing runs.
All results of this section have been given in the regular network case, in which all banks
have the same connectivity. The regular network is to be thought of as a network of core
banks, which have access to repo funding and are prone to bank runs. We expect that our
results would go through qualitatively if we considered a tiered system, the core and the
periphery, as long as the core is strongly connected with sufficiently high probability. In
such an extended model, the peripheral banks may have a smaller connectivity than the
core banks and only core-peripheral directed paths.
The dimension of the problem would double, because the value function in 3 would
depend, in addition to the state of the core banks and the number of interventions on the
core banks, on the state of the peripheral banks and the number of interventions on the
peripheral banks. Let us compute the size of the state space in the homogenous and tiered
case, for the working example in 2. Consider the homogenous case. There are n = 20
banks, and the solvent banks have remaining capital θ = 1, . . . , c (c = 3), in total
(
n+c
c=1771
)
.
There are
(
M+2
2=28
)
possible ways to intervene on core banks at levels 1 and 2, for M = 6.
For our example, the size of the state space is 1771× 28. Suppose now that we introduce a
periphery of n = 20 peripheral banks, and suppose that the interventions budget is M = 12.
Then there are
(
M+3
3=455
)
possible ways to intervene on core banks at levels 1 and 2 and on
peripheral banks at level 1 (assuming that peripheral banks are not prone to repo runs).
The size of the state space becomes the 1771× 1771× 455 ∼ 109. Computing the optimal
solution for a two tiered system under partial information remains tractable (and also for
28
some three-tiered system, using today’s computational power). By comparison, note that
keeping tract of the state of each bank, would yield in the case n = 40 a state space of size
340. It is thus remarkable that the solution for systems with dozens of banks can become
tractable and yield insights on the role of solvency vs. runs. It is clear that such tractability
comes at the expense of imposing a tiered structures with a small number of levels, within
each level banks having the same connectivity.
The dependence of the government strategy on funding capacity has implications on data
collection. From data, one must estimate the probability of bank runs. A large fraction of
the short term lending is done through repo markets. However, because of a lack of data
on bilateral repos in the United States, ”the full picture on repo is yet to be assembled”
Gorton and Metrick (2012b), Krishnamurthy et al. (2014). This is in contrast to European
markets, where repo lending is much more transparent as it goes through a CCP (Eurex)
Mancini et al. (2015). Currently, for US markets only data on money market funds lending
is available see e.g. Gorton and Metrick (2012b), Krishnamurthy et al. (2014). It is critical
to estimate the cost of funding across a variety of types of repo lenders, e.g., money market
funds, securities lender, insurance companies. This would lead to better estimation of bank
run probabilities, which we have shown are central in intervention programs.
6 Conclusions
We analyzed the optimal equity infusions of a government with constrained budget, in
two different information settings. The optimal strategy depends on the government’s
information and is highly sensitive to the presence of banks that are susceptible to bank runs.
From this perspective, to minimize loss it is critical to estimate the banks’ funding capacity
and to acknowledge the role of indirect contagion from capital loss to funding withdrawal
across the system. Collecting data that would allow to estimate funding capacity is equally
(if not more important) than collecting data on exposures.
In presence of banks that are susceptible to bank runs, the intervention must be swifter
and in banks that are otherwise not close to insolvency. The threshold to contagion is smaller
when banks are prone to illiquidity. Under incomplete information, the government does not
know the threshold to contagion. Even for a small fraction of banks that depend on unstable
short term funding, there is discontinuity in the optimal strategy from “patient” intervention
only on banks with low capital to ”immediate” reinforcing of banks with medium capital
(that could be in danger of illiquidity).
We have further compared the reduction in the magnitude of contagion in the partial
and complete information settings. We found that even in the case of partial informa-
tion, contagion is significantly mitigated by intervention, provided the government uses
an adapted strategy. The mitigating effect of intervention is in this case comparable to
the case when government has complete information. This has significant implications for
moral hazard. Under complete information, the government will inject in banks that are
higher in the causal chain of failures. This in turn creates incentives for banks to have
many creditors, and can potentially turn them into “super”-spreaders of contagion or ”too-
interconnected to fail”. In the incomplete information case, the creditors of the initially
failed banks will receive infusions more equitably since there is no information as to which
of them is higher in the causal chain of failure. Less information may decrease moral hazard
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and have comparable mitigation.
There exist, of course, other kinds of interventions for supporting liquidity which do not
take the form of equity infusions, but that of loans or credit guarantees. These are important
topics for future research. Equity infusions in 2008, on the other hand, constituted the
largest ever U.S. government intervention in the financial sector, and our results are intended
to be used as tools for the decision process in this type of interventions.
A Appendix
A.1 Preliminary list of notations
• n - the number of banks;
• N - the set of banks;
• D - generic set of failed banks;
• D0, D1, Dk, ... - cascading failures;
• c - set complement
• ξ(i) - arbitrary equity infusion;
• D(ξ) - the final set of defaults under equity infusion ξ
• DV(i) - the final set of defaults when all banks in V receive infinite equity infusions,
and all other banks do not receive any equity infusions;
•
(
e(i, j)
)
- the exposure matrix (bank i is exposed to bank j);
• c(i) - initial capital;
• c - initial capital, assumed constant across banks in the second part; it gives the
maximum remaining capital throughout the contagion;
• s(i) - short term debt, net of liquid reserves;
• f(i) - the funding capacity;
By abuse of notation, f denotes also the map that gives debt capacity as a function
of capital and number of failed banks,
f(i) = f(c(i), |D)|.
• f−1(s(i), |D|) - the failure barrier for the capital (as a function of the net short term
debt and number of failed banks), the inverse of the debt capacity function;
• θ(i,D) - reamaining capital (after recorded losses);
• θk(i) - in the second part, remaining capital after there are k recorded losses in the
system;
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• α - fraction of banks depending on unstable short term debt;
• L - loss in the system, the optimization criterion;
• M - the intervention budget;
• ξ̃(i) - optimal equity infusion;
• ξV - the minimal equity infusion that “insures” the set V;
• λ - the connectivity, assumed constant across banks in the second part; also the
number of exposures;
• (Tk, ik, jk), k = 1, . . . ,m - the recording of exposure k consists of a 4 - tuple: the time
when this exposure is recorded Tk, the pair of banks, with the convention that ik is
exposed to jk.
• uk ∈ {0, 1} - decision to inject equity in the exposed bank at time Tk;
• uk(θ) ∈ {0, 1} - decision to inject equity in the exposed bank at time Tk given that
the bank with remaining capital θ;
• ũk(θ) - the optimal decision to inject equity in the exposed bank at time Tk
• Xk(θ) - state variables, the number of banks with remaining capital θ;
• Nk(θ) - control variables, the number of interventions on banks at remaining capital
θ;
• Lk(x, `) - the expected loss, starting at step k from state x and a number of interven-
tions `;
• Vk(x, `) - the minimal expected loss; this is the value function in the dynamic pro-
gramming equation;
• V0(X0, 0) - the optimal solution under partial information;
• V̂ - the solution with partial information and one-time infusions;
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The set of infusions ξ̃ which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 is equal to the
set {ξV | V ⊆ N}. The proof of the equality of the two sets is easy to check. Let ξV
defined as above for a set V. It is clear that V
⋂
D(ξV) = ∅, so failed banks do not receive
infusions. Therefore ξV satisfies condition (ii) of Lemma 1. It satisfies condition (i) by
construction. Conversely, for ξ̃ which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1, ξ̃ = ξV
for V := {i | ξ̃(i) > 0}.
Lemma (1) combined with the budget constraint states that solutions to Problem 1
are a subset of {ξV | V ⊆ N ,
∑
i ξ
V(i) ≤ M}. Therefore, in Problem 1 it suffices to
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minimize loss over the restricted equity infusion set {ξV | V ⊆ N ,
∑
i ξ
V(i) ≤M} (and not
{ξ |
∑
i ξ(i) ≤ M}). We conclude that the optimal equity infusion problem can be recast
as the combinatorial optimization problem in the statement of Proposition 1.
A.2.2 Transition probabilities of the controlled Markov chain (X,N)
We define the stopping time
k̄ = inf
{
k |
(
n−
c∑
θ=1
Xk(θ)
)
λ = k
}
,
with k̄ ≤ m, representing the time the cascading failures stop, meaning that all exposures
to defaulted banks (there are (n−
∑c
θ=1Xk(θ))λ such exposures) have been recorded (the
number of recorded exposures is k).
The transition probabilities of the Markov chain are as follows. For all θ ∈ [1, . . . , c], with
probability (λ−c+θ)Xk(θ)−Nk(θ)m−k , the next state will be:
uk(θ) = 0 uk(θ) = 1
Xk+1(θ) = Xk(θ)− 1,
Nk+1(θ) = Nk(θ),
Xk+1(θ) = Xk(θ),
Nk+1(θ) = Nk(θ) + 1.
θ > 2
Xk+1(θ − 1) = Xk(θ − 1) + 1
θ = 2
with probability α : Xk+1(θ − 1) = Xk(θ − 1)
with probability 1− α : Xk+1(θ − 1) = Xk(θ − 1) + 1.
A.2.3 Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1
For the proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 we need the following steps:
(i) We introduce a sequential algorithm that generates a failure cluster with will be shown
to have the same conditional law as the failure cluster in the random financial network.
(ii) We then show by a coupling argument the equivalence of the conditional laws of the
failure clusters in the two algorithms.
In Amini et al. (2016) it has been shown that in the case without intervention, the cluster
of failures on the random network at the end of the cascade process has the same law as
a random graph constructed sequentially. The intuition is as follows. A random matching
can be constructed sequentially: At any step, choose an in-coming half edge according to
any rule based on the history of the matching, and then choose its pair uniformly
among all unmatched out-going half edges.
We now show that this is also the case when the controller has partial information.
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Step 1: An algorithm for sequential construction of the failure cluster. We de-
scribe the construction of the failure cluster in the random financial network, as introduced
in Section 4.1, in the form of the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2. (i) Choose randomly a network from the Configuration Model.
(ii) Let Q the set of unrecorded exposures to failed banks. The set Q initially contains
exposures to nodes in D0. All exposures in Q are assigned a clock which rings after a
random time with law Exp(1), independent of everything else.
(iii) While the queue Q is non-empty, let (ik, jk) the exposure whose clock rings first.
Remove k from Q: Q ← Q \ {k} and record the exposure. The government may
intervene by injecting equity in the node ik (according to their optimization program
under partial information). We denote by u1k the optimal decision.
If ik is left to fail, the exposures of other nodes to ik are added to the queue Q and
assigned a clock of law Exp(1), independent of everything else.
(iv) Repeat until Q = ∅. We denote by C1 = (D1, E1) the failure cluster observed by the
government at the end of the contagion process, with D1 the set of failures, and E1
the set of recorded exposures.
We now introduce a second algorithm, which has the advantage of being sequential, and
which will construct a failure cluster with the same conditional law as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3. Let Q the queue of unexplored in-coming half edges belonging to failed
banks.
(i) Assign to each node i ∈ N , λ out-coming half edges and λ in-coming half edges.
(ii) Add the set of in-coming half edges of fundamentally failed banks to the queue Q and
assign them a clock of law Exp(1), independent of everything else.
(iii) While Q 6= ∅, let k be the half edge whose clock rings first. Remove k from its
queue: Q ← Q \ {k}. Choose uniformly a matching out-going half edge among all
unmatched out-going half edges and form an edge. Let ik be the node to which the
chosen out-going half-edge belongs and record the exposure.
The government may intervene by injecting equity in node ik (according to their opti-
mization program under partial information). We denote by u2k the optimal decision.
If ik is left to fail, then the λ in-coming half edges of ik are added to the queue Q and
assigned a clock of law Exp(1), independent of everything else.
(iv) Repeat until Q = ∅. We denote by C2 = (D2, E2) the failure cluster observed by the
government at the end of the contagion process.
Note that the difference between Algorithms 2 and 3 is that, in the first case, the network
is drawn from the configuration model in the first step of the algorithm and then the failure
cluster is generated using a supplementary queue which is unobserved by the government,
whereas, in the second case, the network is generated at the same time as the failure cluster.
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Step 2. We now need to show that, at any time t, the law of the failure cluster is the same
for the two algorithms, conditional on observing at time t the same partial failure cluster
and number of interventions.
We let the failure cluster observed at time t, C1t := (D1t , E1t ) in Algorithm 2 and respec-
tively C2t := (D2t , E2t ) in Algorithm 3. We denote by N1t and N2t the respective number of
interventions. The respective failure clusters C1t and C
2
t are observed, in case we have a clock
ringing, before the exposure is recorded and the intervention decision is made. We denote
by H1t and respectively H2t the history of the cluster observation in the two algorithms.
Lemma 2. For any network function F , and time t there exists a deterministic function
(depending on F ) Gt such that:
E(F (C1)|H1t ) = Gt(C1t , N1t ),
and
E(F (C2)|H2t ) = Gt(C2t , N2t ).
Proof. We prove this claim by backward induction on the number of links in the observed
failure cluster.
Let t such that |E1t | = m, i.e., we have recorded m write-downs. Thus, we must be after
the end of the cascade. So C1 = C1t , and therefore
E(F (C1)|H1t ) = F (C1t , N1t ).
Likewise, for t such that |E2t | = m,
E(F (C1)|H2t ) = F (C2t , N2t ).
Suppose now that the two claims hold for observed failure clusters with a number of
links greater than k. We now show that the two claims hold when the observed failure
clusters have k links.
Let us consider first the case when a clock rings precisely at time t. In this case, the history
H1t+ is strictly larger than H1t , since it contains the information about the newly recorded
exposure and the controller’s decision. More importantly, because at time t+ there is an
additional exposure added to the observed cluster, we are under the induction hypothesis.
Using iterated conditioning, we have
E(F (C1)|H1t ) = E(E(F (C1)|H1t+)|H1t )
= E(G1t+(C1t+, N1t+))|H1t )
=: G1t (C
1
t , N
1
t ),
where in the second equality, we have used the induction step. The last equality (and
implicit definition) holds because, conditional on a clock ringing, C1t+ results from C
1
t in
two steps:
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(i) First, the newly recorded exposure must have been formed at Step (i) of Algorithm 2
by matching an in-coming half-edge belonging to a recorded failure with an out-going
half edge. Due to the independence of the clock on everything else and the memoryless
property of exponential distribution, this matching is conditionally uniform over all
such matchings of unexplored half-edges entering the failure cluster C1t .
(ii) The induction step can be applied for the total loss L. There exists a function GLt+
such that the optimization in (iii) of Algorithm 2
min
u
E(GLt+(C1t+, N1t+)|Ht),
with the understanding that C1t+ and N
1
t+ depend on the decision u
1
t . Since u
1
t is
decided after the exposure is recorded, and since nodes of same remaining capital
θ are indistinguishable, we have that u1t depends on the new information (the new
exposure) only through the exposed node’s remaining capital θ. Moreover, because
the loss criterion depends on the history of the default cluster only through the current
state C1t and N
1
t It follows that u
1
t = u
1
t (d,C
1
t , N
1
t ).
Take now a time t when no clock rings, and let T 1 the next time a clock rings. In this
case
E(F (C1)|H1t ) = E(E(F (C1)|H1T1)|H
1
t )
= E(G1T 1(C
1
T1 , N
1
T1)|H
1
t )
= G1t (C
1
t , N
1
t ),
where the second equality holds since there is a jump at time T1. We have that C
1
T1
= C1t ,
the failure cluster does not change between t and T1. Moreover, because the loss criterion
depends only on the failure cluster and is time independent, it also holds that there are no
interventions between t and T1, so N
1
T1
= N1t and we obtain the last equality with G
1
t = G
1
T 1 .
Note that this point concludes the proof of the statement of Proposition 2, that inter-
ventions only occur when a clock rings.
For the second algorithm, we consider a time t when a clock rings (The case when no
clock rings is treated similarly as in the first algorithm).
E(F (C2)|H2t ) = E(E(F (C2)|H2t+)|H2t )
= E(G2t+(C2t+, N2t+))|H2t )
=: G2t (C
2
t , N
2
t ),
where C2t+ denotes the failure cluster resulting from C
2
t using the procedure at Step (iii) of
Algorithm 3. We obtain that the control used by the government at this point is Markovian
and depends on the new information only through the remaining capital of the exposed
node u2t = u
2
θ(C
2
t , N
2
t ) ∈ {0, 1}.
We are only left to show that, G1t = G
2
t , for which it is enough to show that the
conditional laws of C2t+ are the same as the conditional laws of C
2
t+, for any control choice
u ∈ {0, 1}. For this, remark that in Algorithm 3, the out-going half edge is chosen uniformly
among all unmatched half edges and the in-coming half-edge belongs to a recorded failure.
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Since the past control (us)s<t is non-anticipative, the histrory H2t does not contain any
information on the future matching, which has thus a conditionally uniform law as in the
case of Algorithm 2. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Thanks to Proposition 2, it is enough to study the solution in discrete time, with the
time k given by the k-th time a clock rings. By Proposition 2, the transition probabilities of
the auxiliary Markov chains follow directly from the law of the failure cluster resulting from
C2t using the procedure at Step (iii) of Algorithm 3. One can immediately check that these
transition probabilities are precisely those given in Section A.2.2. Therefore, the solution
of the dynamic programming equations is the solution of the equity infusion problem, and
this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
In the next subsection we give the dynamic programming equations verified by the value
function.
A.2.4 The value function
We let
A :=
{
(X, `) |
c∑
θ=1
X(θ) ≤ n and
c∑
θ=1
`(θ) ≤M
}
be the set of admissible values for the state variables. We define Vk(X, `) the value function
when, at time t ≥ 0, there have been made ` interventions (X, `) ∈ A.
We denote by X ′ the next state, without intervention, when a half edge of a bank with
remaining capital θ is chosen, and the bank depends on short term funding. When the bank
does not depend on short term funding, the next state is denoted by X ′′.
We have
Vk(X, `) =
∑
θ
(λ− c+ θ)X(θ)− `(θ)
m− k
min{Vk+1(X, `+ eθ), αVk+1(X ′, `)
+ (1− α)Vk+1(X ′′, `)}
with the following boundary conditions. For all (X, `) ∈ A, we have
• for all k ≥ k̄ := (n−
∑c
θ=1X(θ))d,
Vk(X, `) = c(n−
c∑
θ=1
X(θ)) +
c∑
θ=1
(c− d)X(θ)
• for all ` such that
∑c
θ=1 `(θ) = M (the intervention budget is exhausted),
Vk(X, `) =
∑
X′
p(k,X,X ′)Vk+1(X
′, `),
where p denotes the transition probabilities in Section A.2.2.
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